"The Dignity of Living Beings With Regard to Plants"
I found a linkable cite for the Swiss ethics committee report on the "dignity" of plants. So, I thought I'd put a few pithy quotes up that have not appeared in my discussion here at SHS about the study or in my Weekly Standard piece.
Sometimes materialistic Darwinists will state that there really are no species distinctions between humans and animals because we and they share a high number of genes. Whenever that argument has been made in the past, I have joked, "Well, if you really want to get reductionist, carrots are made up of carbon molecules and so are humans. Hence, there is no real distinction to be made between us." Well, the big brains in Switzerland have precisely adopted that "joke" as one of the bases for granting individual plants "dignity." From the report:
Some members were of the opinion that plants are not part of the moral community, because they do not satisfy the conditions for belonging to this community...A further group felt that there were particular situations in which people should refrain from something for the sake of a plant, unless there are sufficient grounds to the contrary. This opinion was justified either by arguing that plants strive after something, which should not be blocked without good reason, or that recent findings in natural science, such as the many commonalities between plants, animals and humans at molecular and cellular level, remove the reasons for excluding plants in principle from the moral community.You have to be really big brained to take my jest seriously. But some on the committee take that very position. Unbelievable.
Most of the committee either believed that plants are sentient, or could not say that they are not:
The majority of the committee members at least do not rule out the possibility that plants are sentient, and that this is morally relevant. A minority of these members considers it probable that plants are sentient. Another minority assumes that the necessary conditions for the possibility of sentience are present in plants. The presence of these necessary conditions for sentience is considered to be morally relevant. Finally, a minority of the members excludes the possibility of plants having sentience, because in their view there are no good grounds for such an assumption.Plants are living beings. But sentience means the ability to feel and experience sensation. Plants are not aware in this sense. They are not conscious and cannot by their natures be conscious.
Finally--and I find this very telling--the Swiss ethicists considered and rejected "theocentrism" (being part of God's creation as the root of dignity), "ratiocentrism" (the capacity to reason as the root of mattering for their own sake, e.g. personhood theory), "pathocentrism" (sentience as the basis for moral worth, an animal rights ideology), but did not consider "humancentrism," the idea that being human is what matters the most morally, regardless of the value we convey to other life forms on the planet. Hence, human exceptionalism was not even thought about. The utter rejection of the intrinsic and inherent value of human life against which I have been warning is spreading and does not bode well for the future of the human community and the achievement of universal human rights.
Labels: "The Dignity of Living Beings With Regard to Plant." Human Exceptionalism
posted by Wesley J. Smith @ 9:30 AM
23 Comments
23 Comments:
Mr. Smith,
I must say I find all of this utterly dismaying.
I know you argue for human exceptionalism, but what do you ground it in? Why should anyone think humans have inherent moral worth?
Jason
From a reader: "First let me tell you I am a religious Jew, I believe in God, I believe that human beings have souls given to them by that God, and that good behavior will be rewarded by the God and bad behavior will be punished, either in this world or the world to come.
That said, I believe that animals too have souls given to them by our Creator, but animal souls are very violent and primitive ones, and can even be dangerous to the souls of human beings. Our Rabbis actually forbid Jews to take dogs or cats into our homes as pets because of this. The animals soul can become intermixed with his human master's soul and cause that soul to diminish and become more animal like and less divine. I actually see this in the radical animal rights movement, some of whose groups have even murdered other people to "save" animals.
This animal rights movement is the logical extension of the diminishing of the Judeo Christian ethic, which places man above all the animals on the earth, the birds in the sky, the fish in the sea, and the plants on the ground. Along with legal abortion, which has become the wholesale massacre of American and European babies, animal and now plant rights (Good God, can this really be serious?), may ultimately accomplish what no outright war could ever accomplish, the final destruction of Western civilization."
Me: I don't know much about animal souls. In fact, I strongly disagree about the value of pets. But I sure do worry about the destruction of Western civilization.
Wesley, you were good on TV, but it’s really hard to listen to you when they keep showing Megan Kelley. Sorry.
I think this story is excellent because it's a train wreck. We should just stay out of the way and let them keep making idiots out of themselves. There's one thing for sure, the Peter Singers, the anti-human exceptionalists and personhood theorists would have a difficult time embracing plant dignity after a generation of arguing that the unborn is expendable because he or she does not yet have a brain, cannot value his or her future or existence, is not self aware, isn't capable of rational thought, and etc to do what they want with the unborn and even newborns, because plants don’t possess these attributes either. Those who advocated for Teri Schiavo’s two week state sanctioned execution by saying that people like her were in a “persistent vegetative state,” “vegetables,” “a potted plant” or whatever condescending, demeaning, bigoted comments they made about her, they can’t take this position either because they used her and other’s alleged likeness to plants and vegetable as grounds to dispose of her and others as they wished. But I hope to God that they do. I would pay for a front row seat to see them all try to harmonize this after a generation of personhood theorizing. That would be more fun than a three ring circus or being at the Nevada Republican State Convention.
When did I get such a high forehead?
The answer is ridicule. Thick and righteous.
This is an example of Armstrong's law (as I call it), which appeared in a Liberty Magazine article by Ari Armstrong:
"ARMSTRONG'S LAW: A libertarian's reductio ad absurdum is often a bureaucrat's logical conclusion.
"
Hey, why didn't they also look at egocentrism, the idea that I am the one that matters the most morally? Honestly, these Swiss are utterly rejecting the 'intrinsic and inherent value' of being me!
Mr. Smith,
I am still awaiting your response to my question, if you have the time to answer it. Thank you.
Jason
Jason: Sorry, but I have written about that often. Here are just a few points: First, we are the only known moral beings in the known universe, and the entire issue of moral worth is strictly a human conversation about human duties. We uniquely have duties. No other species has them. We can get into capacities also, and I suspect you will respond that developmentally disabled people might not have those capacities, etc. The usual. But we are speaking of natural species capacities, not those of individuals. Indeed, basing value on individual capacites destroys human rights.
The bases for refusing to accept human exceptionalism, as I see it, involve either 1) Measuring individual capacities (see above) 2) Claiming that the ability to feel pain gives value (Ryder and painience) or the existence of mere sentience (Francione and abolitionism), or 3) Being alive as the Swiss have now done.
Another view is religiously based, but I don't go there.
Pick your poison, but if we decide that being human has no special meaning in its own right, we are not only going to cause great human harm and impede human flourishing, but undermine the very duties that those who reject human exceptionalism wish us to assume--which is an exceptional activity that is uniquely human.
Can't have it both ways.
How do you plants don't have duties? How do you know we have duties?
I'm also curious as to why you chose 'duties' instead of 'rights'.
Joshua: I chose to focus on duties as just one area where humans are unique. Whole books can and have been written on this issue.
We have duties because only we have a true moral sense. That is one reason why only we have true rights as a species.
This is why the arguments about animal "rights" and plant "dignity" are nonsensical. Only humans understand rights, convey rights, respect rights. Any rights so accorded would only apply to human behavior. Indeed, what we are actually discussing is the extent and scope of human duty. It is a conversation about humans, by humans, and involving only humans. Exclusively. No other known species have the capacity to participate. And in that, we are undeniably exceptional.
Plants are utterly insentient. They can't act volitionally. You want to explain how a plant can have a duty?
From our moral sense, we get duties, and those duties we can come up with rights.
So, if we have a duty not to let an animal suffer from pain (for example, by putting it down), that would means that animals have a right not to suffer pain.
Most humans, with their moral sense, would feel bad about an animal in pain. We have empathy towards our pets, and other animals. So, we could say that because of this empathy, we can afford animals certain rights.
Likewise, if some humans have a moral sense that makes them feel bad about pulling the petal from a flower for no reason at all, then why does that not mean that we have conveyed the plant some rights?
(I'd also argue that all mammals have a limited moral sense. Considering that morality is an evolved behaviour, this is only to be expected.)
Joshua: If animals had "rights" they would have it against other animals. They don't. They also have no duties. Hence, they are not rights bearers.
A sick dog has no "right" to be euthanized. We put such animals down out of empathy and a desire to alleviate suffering. The person who feels bad about plucking a flower does not thus give the flower a right not to be plucked. That turns rights into feelings.
As for morality evolving, maybe so, maybe not. Life has been here for about 1 billion years, and we have only been here for about 100,000 years, yet WE have morality and animals that have been here far longer do not.
Somehow, someway, morality is a human trait. Whether it is a product of evolution or something else remains to be seen. I suspect it is a product of consciousness, which we don't yet understand or know how we, alone in the known history of the universe, achieved it.
Animals could have rights, but only humans can acknowledge them. It could still be wrong for a lion to rip the neck of a gazelle, but the lion doesn't know that - and is therefore innocent.
I do not see why only those who can also bear duties can have rights. As an example, a human embryo does not have duties (or does it?), but you have oft argued it has certain rights. Young human children are also excused of certain duties (and are not held criminally responsible), yet they still have rights. They are what Tom Regan has called 'moral patients'.
The aside about evolution will go off-topic, but I'd imagine that a trait like morality would only be truly useful in animals with complex social systems, and would also only be possible in animals that have also evolved (probably for other reasons) complex brains. Humans do not seem to be the only ones with morality (depending, of course, how that is defined), but we do seem to be aware that we have it.
Joshua: It seems to me we are arguing semantics. If animals have rights that only humans recognize, then we are back to human duties.
It is a matter of our natures, not our individual capacities at the moment. Human embryos by their nature are duties bearing individuals. So too are those who have lost individual capacities due to illness or injury. It seems to me that rights and duties are part human nature.
The lion isn't acting wrongly. He is acting like a lion. Predation is a necessary and beneficial part of natural systems.
How do you know what a human's nature is? And what possesses a human nature? The nature of a human embryo seems to me to be different to the nature of a typical adult human. Likewise for those who have lost key mental capacities.
The lion is acting like a lion, and is performing a necessary and beneficial part of a system, but is still wrong for causing pain to his prey. We cannot blame him, for he doesn't know it, but nonetheless (if it were possible for humans to do so) we should eliminate the suffering, while still leaving the rest intact.
Joshua: You confuse nature with individual ability. The nature of the human species is to have a moral sense, just as it is the nature of the human species to be able to speak. Some individuals have not yet developed it, or have lost it, but that does not mean it is not in their nature.
Pain is part of Darwinian life. It isn't wrong. It just is.
You are viewing the predator/prey paradigm through a distinctly human lense. That is anthropomorphization and sentimentalization of the natural world. How human of you.
It does not appear to me that all rights and duties are given based upon some 'human nature' that is possessed (or not possessed) by some humans.
Considering some rights, such as the right to vote or to marry, many individuals (such as children) are not awarded such a right even though could be said to be 'in their nature' to be able to express an opinion or to have a life partner. It appears that individual ability trumps 'the nature of the human species' in all but a few cases.
It could also be said that it is in the 'nature of life' to be conscious. Just because some species, such as carrots, have no developed such a capacity, it doesn't mean it is not in their nature.
Lastly, just because something is, that doesn't mean it ought to be. For instance, humans are not naturally immune to HIV, but surely once a vaccine is developed we will be of the opinion that all humans should receive it to become immune to HIV. Surely you cannot be arguing that the naturalistic fallacy is not actually a fallacy.
Mr. Smith,
I am with you on the issue of human exceptionalism, but I find it difficult to defend the notion apart from a theistic worldview in which God creates man with a specific nature in His image, imbuing him with intrinsic worth. I would very much like to be persuaded, however, that human value is not dependent on theism. So please don’t take my further challenges as belligerent.
I agree with you that we are exceptional among the animal kingdom, in that we have capacities no other animal has (moral sense, rationality, altruism, etc.), but how does this argue for human value? Even if we could find 100 ways in which we are exceptional when compared against all other animals, how could these 100 abilities imbue us with value? Why think they are value-laden? On the face of it, it seems these differences only show that we are…well…different, not that we are valuable. How does being different give us value?
You say we must base our values on the capacities of a species, not any individual member of the species. But how does one come to know what the capacities of any given species is? Inductively, by looking at individuals. We look at a large sampling of individuals and notice that they all share X,Y, and Z, and conclude that the natural capacities of that species includes X,Y, and Z. But what about the anomalies in that species who do not exhibit X,Y, and Z? If X,Y, and Z is what makes the species valuable, and person r does not have X,Y, and Z, why should they be considered valuable?
The only way to get out of this quandary, it seems, is to make a distinction between capacities and abilities. Capacities are valuable, even when one does not have the ability to actualize that capacity due to some disabling medical problem (I think that is what you meant, but you only used the word “capacities”). This is what you mean by us having certain “natures.” Of course, the notion of natures requires a certain philosophical anthropology that makes little sense in certain worldviews (atheism, Darwinism), but a lot of sense in others (theism). So it seems to me that human exceptionalism, defined and defended in the way you are defining and defending it, is not apparent on its face. It requires one to establish a prior foundation.
I think your argument that we cannot say we are not special, while at the same time claim we have special moral obligations in the biological world is a strong one. But what would you say to the evolutionary naturalist who rejects the notion of natures? What would you say to the person who claims that all of life, including human life, is the result of random chance processes that did not have us in mind? On this view, our exceptionalism is just the result of chance. We’re lucky, not special. Being lucky doesn’t make someone valuable. Indeed, if the only reason to think we’re special is because our capacities are greater than other animals, what would happen if after millions of years more evolution humans have been surpassed by other life forms, where we are no longer exceptional? Would we cease having value, or experience a diminution of value?
I don't think of it as belligerent at all, Jason.
I think that a non theistic approach is very feasible, based certainly on capacities, which are unique in the known history of the universe. They are of kind as well as of quality. Also, if we believe that human rights should be a universally accepted concept, that too requires human exceptionalism.
A good philosopher to read in this regard is Mortimer Adler.
I don't like the hypothetical of the type you pose because they tend to deflect us from focusing on the way things are. Not that I don't think they are interesting, but a firewall should be kept between knocking us off the pedestal based on such hypotheticals and such interesting discussions.
I suppose that if another species were discovered that possessed the kinds of attributes that make human beings unique, such that they would have moral duties, language, the ability to project abstractly, empathy for the other, the capacity to create civilization and to be able to at least partially control nature instead of being subject wholly to it, then we might have two exceptional species. But I very much doubt whether such a species will be discovered in our lifetimes, if ever.
And if they do come along, what is to say that their value could not be theistically valued as well as emperically? Indeed, if a spiritual sense comes with true consciousness, it would not be surprising if they had religion of some sort. And then you would be right back to where you are now.
I recall a letter to the editor that was published against one of my animal rights pieces saying that if an animal composed a symphany, Wesley Smith would still not support animal rights! Nonsensical no? No animal, other than humans, have ever--and almost certainly will ever--compose a symphany.
When you say humans are “exceptional,” are you making a comparative judgment (we are exceptional when compared against all other life forms), a moral judgement (we are more valuable than all other life forms), or both? I have been interpreting you to mean both, but I just realized that I may be wrong about that, and as a result my questions to you may have been slightly misdirected.
If you only mean the first, only a fool could challenge you (I’m sure they do, and thus they are). If you mean the second or third, it is not obvious that we have moral worth, or that we’re more valuable than other life forms. We’re back to the grounding question, then: why think humans have moral worth, and superior moral worth at that? That was the thrust of my challenge to you in my last round of comments, but I didn’t discern an answer to this question in your response.
You spoke of our unique capacities again, but I don’t see where you answered my question as to why we should think any of those unique capacities imbue us with moral worth. They make us different, yes, but why should we value those differences such that humans should be considered special, rather than just unique? Why value those capacities, versus another set of capacities? Indeed, why value any capacities at all? Is there any non-question-begging way to defend the capacities criterion for human value?
Orthodox Darwinian evolutionists reject the notion of natures, and see all of life as equally worthless in an ultimate sense. Humans are not exceptional in a moral sense, but only in a functional sense. How did we become functionally exceptional? Luck. And there is no moral worth attached to being lucky. How would you ground your claim to human exceptionalism (specifically, the idea that humans have moral worth) if you were challenged to do so by a Darwinian evolutionist? I don’t see how pointing out our exceptional capacities would do anything to challenge his view that humans, like everything else, have no ultimate value that requires that they be treated in a certain way, or that they treat others in a certain way.
Both. I think that one leads to the other.
That, plus our first duty to human beings. If you want to be pure materialistic and Neo Darwinistic about it, all species put themselves first. We should too. If we don't--and often we don't--that is because we have a moral sense possessed by no other species. If we didn't, rather than cancel the salmon season because of a poor harvest, we would just kill all the seals who are competing for those fish and have no such constraints.
But we should, and my opinion do, have higher moral worth precisely because there is no other species like us, and as far as we know, never has been. I also mentioned that the protection of universal human rights is essential to accepting this POV. Otherwise, the danger is that the consequence will be social Darwinism or raw utilitarianism, and we have seen precisely where such ideas lead.
If you get real down and dirty in the reductinist mud, why should ANY attribute imbue ANY living or non living thing with moral value?
Being the only species that can even try to figure any of this out, at the least I think it is fair to say that unless we put ourselves on the pedestal, unless we see human life as qualitatively different than any other form of life, and acknowledge that this matters, and moreover that the consequence of denying our unique moral worth would be, as it has in the past been, horrendous--a terrible scourge of violence against the weak, or as we are also saying, a loss of confidence in ourselves, with a resulting thwarting of human flourishing.
And that is precisely where it seems to me some wish to take us.
The pure materialist can deny natures all he or she wants. But that isn't science. It is belief.
We can demonstrate that humans have natures (or capacities) that are substantially different from any other life form. We can't prove emperically that such differences should matter morally, but they can't prove that they shouldn't matter morally.
This is an area that is beyond science. It lies in the subjective realms of philosophy, values, religion, moral reasoning, etc. distinctly human endeavors in which we engage, it seems to me, because that is part of what human beings are. That is part of what we do. It may even be part of consciousness.
But these ultimate issues are beyond science, which is a method of obtaining and applying knowledge. When science is seen as a way to create morality, it ceases to be science and becomes scientism, which is as much a subjective belief system as is Catholocism or stoicism.
In short: Moral value cannot be proved or disproved, the way that the law of gravity can be proved or disproved. It is a fool's errand to try. We can only seek to persuade, based of facts (unique capacities, etc.) yes, but also , purposes, conequences, and hopes.
Hope that helps.
Thank you for taking the time to interact with my points.
Yes, that helps, but I still don’t see that you have offered any ontological grounding for human value. You point out once again how different we are (rightly so), as if that is what gives us moral worth. But being different is not the same as possessing value. Being different just makes us different. As you said, “If you get real down and dirty in the reductinist mud, why should ANY attribute imbue ANY living or non living thing with moral value?” It can’t. Ontological value must have its origin in some transcendent source who has imbued us with value.
Apart from some transcendent source for human value, human value is just a social fiction. We may ascribe value to ourselves (because we ascribe value to human capacities), but thinking of ourselves as valuable does not make us so. Of course, it is to the advantage of our own survival as a species to invest ourselves with moral worth, but this doesn’t make it any less of a fiction.
The reasons you put forth for affirming human exceptionalism are practical in nature. You reason that the consequences of denying human exceptionalism are bad, so we need to affirm human exceptionalism in order to avoid them. While I agree that we need to consider the consequences of an idea when judging its truth value, doesn’t this beg the question? After all, the consequences you say are bad are the very things your opponents are fighting to achieve (as you noted). So how can you convince them that their agenda is wrong in a manner that does not beg the question? It seems to me the only way you can convince them of your viewpoint is to ground human exceptionalism ontologically; i.e. show that all humans have actual value. Noting that we are different, or that a denial of human exceptionalism leads to negative consequences does not show this. But you avoid ontology altogether, which makes it rather difficult to ground human exceptionalism ontologically!
I agree with you that science cannot determine ethics. That is the domain of other disciplines such as theology and philosophy. So why don’t you use those in your defense of human exceptionalism? Without them, your claim that all humans have value appears to be a mere assertion, not an argument. As such, it is unlikely to persuade our opponents.
I agree that human “unexceptionalism” is undarwinian. But this would only mean the person advocating it is stupid, not that he is immoral. It would only be immoral to treat humans with indignity if they possess intrinsic moral worth. But if value is just some socio-cultural fiction we invented and entitled ourselves to, dispensing with it cannot be wrong.
As far as natures go, if evolutionary theory is true, it is highly implausible that natures exist as such. A nature is traditionally understood to be a fixed set of capacities that demarcate one type of thing from another. In evolution, however, there is no such thing as a fixed set of capacities. Everything is in flux. If one accepts evolutionary theory and its metaphysical implications, then, they are likely to reject your notion that human natures exist. What you see as human nature they see as abilities gained or lost by certain biological configurations. It’s just function, nothing more and nothing less. And if affirming human exceptionalism boils down to valuing functions X,Y, and Z, and human Q does not exhibit those functions, I don’t see any way to maintain that Q is valuable…apart from a transcendent source of value.
I promise this is my last post! I'll let you have the last word if you choose to offer it.
Jason: I have used philosophical views and will in my upcoming book. But I don't think I have made mere assertions. But this is not the place for more detailed discussions.
Regarding Darwinism: Even if natures change, they are what they are today. I think most of us would say that there is such a thing as human nature. Consciousness is one that is true across the breadth of the entire population, unless one is ill or injured. Language is also part of human nature, to the point that children raised without adults will invent their own language.
This is different from wolf nature and mouse nature.
The alleged plasticity of these natures is quite beside the point, it seems to me. And indeed, the utter deconstructionism inherent in that approach means that nothing is ever true other than no truth. That's a prescription for chaos.
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